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In the event of a foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States, local, state, 
and federal authorities will implement a foreign animal disease emergency response plan 
restricting the pork supply chain movements and likely disrupting the continuity of the 
swine industry business. To minimize disruptions of the food supply while providing an 
effective response in an outbreak, it is necessary to have proactive measures in place 
to ensure minimal disease spread and maximum continuation of business. Therefore, 
it is critical to identify candidate movements for proactive risk assessments: those that 
are both most likely to contribute to disease spread and most necessary for business 
continuity. To do this, experts from production, harvest, retail, and allied pork industries 
assessed 30 common pork supply movements for risk of disease spread and industry 
criticality. The highest priority movements for conducting a risk assessment included 
the movement of weaned pigs originating from multiple sow farm sources to an off-site 
nursery or wean to finish facility, the movement of employees or commercial crews, the 
movement of vaccination crews, the movement of dedicated livestock hauling trucks, 
and the movement of commercial crews such as manure haulers and feed trucks onto, 
off, or between sites. These critical movements, along with several others identified in 
this study, will provide an initial guide for prioritization of risk management efforts and 
resources to be better prepared in the event of a FMD outbreak in the United States. 
By specifically and proactively targeting movements that experts agree are likely to 
spread the disease and are critical to the continuity of business operations, potentially 
catastrophic consequences in the event of an outbreak can be limited.
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inTrODUcTiOn
In the event of a foot-and-mouse disease (FMD) outbreak in the United States., local, state, and 
federal authorities will implement an emergency response plan as described in the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA APHIS) Foreign 
Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (1). This response includes a control and eradica-
tion strategy that will utilize depopulation, quarantine, vaccination, and managed movement control 
measures applied throughout the swine industry. The document recognizes the need to develop a 
strategic plan to address managed movement control and its implications for continuity of business 
in foreign animal disease preparedness planning (1).
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Continuity of business, in the context of the food supply, 
means the ability of a farm or food processor to continue key 
operations of production and distribution of safe, high quality 
food, and agricultural commodities despite disruption of normal 
operational procedures (1, 2). These key operations are critical 
to business vitality and may cause severe economic losses for the 
industry if disrupted for prolonged periods of time by managed 
movement controls (3). In order for any managed movement to 
take place, incident commanders must issue official movement 
permits for animals or commodities that have an acceptable level 
of risk. These permits need to be guided by a risk assessment or 
science-based evaluation (2).
Completing a risk assessment in a timely manner during 
an outbreak is typically impractical and not conducive for the 
coordination of managed movement (4). Developing risk assess-
ments requires significant time, thereby potentially delaying the 
movement of pigs or pork products that may represent negligible 
risk for disease spread. Throughout the swine industry, there is 
a heavy reliance on continuous movement of animals, and the 
timely delivery of animal feed, supplies, and products. Even brief 
disruptions in the supply of products or movement of animals 
can result in devastating economic losses as well as serious 
animal welfare concerns, as available inventory capacity is often 
limited (3, 5).
Risk assessments conducted proactively, before an outbreak, 
can identify mitigation strategies to reduce the potential for 
disease spread and facilitate business continuity. This is done by 
supporting the timely movement of animals and products that 
represent an acceptable low risk for disease spread, while provid-
ing additional resources and safeguards to restrict those move-
ments that pose a high risk of spreading disease. It is this balance 
between “acceptable risk” of disease spread and importance for 
business continuity that incident commanders will be seeking 
when issuing managed movement orders. Invariably, there may 
exist movements that are both critical to business continuity, but 
also pose a high risk for disease spread. These movements are 
important candidates for conducting a proactive risk assessment 
due to the anticipated negative consequences for the overall 
industry if they are not completed in a timely manner. However, 
little information is available about which specific movements in 
the pork supply chain are critical to both the potential for disease 
spread and the economic viability of the industry. Identifying 
critical movements at the intersection of these two factors is 
essential for effectively guiding an emergency response in the 
face of a transboundary disease outbreak such as FMD in swine.
The objective of this study is to establish a framework for 
prioritizing critical movements within the pork supply chain 
according to experts’ perception of the likelihood of spreading 
FMD and the importance of the movements for the continuity 
of business.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
recruitment of experts
To effectively evaluate the risk and impact of various move-
ments in the pork supply chain, opinions were solicited from 
experts who were actively engaged within the swine industry, 
including pork producers, veterinarians, and academics. Experts 
were recruited from multiple parts of the production chain, so 
collectively they would be able to evaluate risk across all of the 
movements. An online survey (6) was distributed via email to the 
American Association of Swine Veterinarians (AASV) mailing 
list, and respondents were encouraged to forward the invitation 
to other industry professionals in an effort to capture a diversity 
of responses. AASV is a non-profit educational professional 
society for veterinarians that specialize in swine health and man-
agement for the purposes of pork production. To help recruit 
more experts, announcements about the survey were made at 
the 2015 Leman Swine Health Conference and at the 2015 World 
Pork Expo, which are two technical meetings attended by a large 
group of AASV members, as well as many other swine industry 
producers and professionals each year. The announcements 
were followed with an email and link to the survey in the weekly 
AASV e-newsletter.
Fifty-one experts completed the survey, and an additional 19 
provided partial responses (a further 8 consented to participate 
but did not answer any question, so no information about them 
is known). Experts indicated their line of work in the survey, and 
respondents included swine producers (n = 9), harvest industry 
(n = 4), retail/distribution (n = 10), and allied industries (n = 47). 
Those in allied industries could specify one or more industries. 
Of those who specified (n = 31), responses included veterinar-
ians (n = 25), non-veterinarian academic or government work-
ers (n =  4), and media/industry (n =  2). Pork producers were 
asked additional demographic questions regarding the size of 
their production, the type of operation, and the frequency of pig 
movements. Producers and those in allied industries were also 
asked about the size and location of their facilities or location of 
their involvement, and whether they had biosecurity protocols 
in place.
Prioritization of critical Movements
To prioritize the critical movements among the pork supply 
chain, questions were included on the survey to elicit expert 
opinion on FMD-related threats with the goal of identifying 
movements that have the highest perceived risk of disease spread 
and that are understood to be most critical to the business opera-
tion. Thirty common pork supply movements were identified 
based on the structure of the current pork production chain 
in the United States (7). Included were movements of all live 
pigs, genetic material, feed, equipment, personnel, and materi-
als that are common to the multistage production systems that 
predominate in the United States. Movements of finished pork 
products post-harvest were also considered. These movements 
were divided into five main categories of the pork production 
chain: equipment, genetics, general (live animals), harvest and 
processing, and personnel (Table 1).
Experts were asked to assign each of the thirty movements to 
one of the four categories describing its risk of disease spread: no 
or slight risk, low risk, some risk, or high risk of FMD disease 
spread. Then, they were asked to estimate the time at which the 
restriction of each movement during an outbreak would have a 
significant negative consequence on business (e.g., high likeli-
hood of bankruptcy and negative impact on animal welfare). 
Table 1 | consensus scores for perceived risk of FMD spread, and the mean time until a negative impact on business continuity would occur for each 
movement.
category number consensus high risk  
of disease spread
Majority placement for  
risk of disease spread
Time to negative  
business impact
Movement description
Equipment 
and feed
1 59 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Feed onto production sites
2 54 Unclear consensus 7–14 days Supplies onto production sites
3 76 High 7–14 days Shared equipment onto production sites
4a 79 High 2–7 days Contracted or shared livestock trucks onto production sites
5 60 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Dedicated livestock trucks among company production sites
Live animals 6 60 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Weaned pigs to off-site nursery, wean to finish, or finishing 
(single source)
7 78 High 7–14 days Finishing pigs direct to slaughter
8 69 Unclear consensus 14–21 days Replacement gilts into a sow unit
9a 90 High 2–7 days Weaned pigs to off-site nursery, wean to finish, or finishing 
(multiple sources)
10 65 Unclear consensus 7–14 days Feeder pigs to finishing (e.g., from nursery to finishing)
11 63 Unclear consensus 14–21 days Cull sows and boars direct to slaughter
12 84 High 14–21 days Off size and cull pigs, sows, and boars to sale barn/buying 
station
13a 80 High 7–14 days Off size and cull pigs, sows, and boars from sale barn/
buying station to slaughter
14 82 High 14–21 days Feeder pigs from sale barn to production site
15 71 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Dead stock to off-site disposal (landfill, rendering, etc.)
16 55 Unclear consensus 14–21 days Manure to field application off-site
Genetic 17 52 Unclear consensus 14–21 days Replacement gilts and boars into production system 
isolation
18 70 Unclear consensus 14–21 days Replacement gilts and boars onto production site
19 50 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Semen into a production system (breeding herd)
Harvesting and 
processing
20 44 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Fresh carcasses to off-site processing
21 43 Unclear consensus 2–7 days Raw inedibles (byproducts) from harvest site to further 
processing
22 30 Unclear consensus 7–14 days Rendered inedibles from harvest site to further processing
23 19 Low 2–7 days Finished products to distributing
24 23 Low 2–7 days Fresh products to point of service
25 19 Low 7–14 days Ready to eat products to point of service
Personnel 26a 76 High 2–7 days Employees onto, off, and/or between production site(s)
27 72 Unclear consensus 7–14 days Routine service providers (e.g., plumbers, electricians, etc.) 
onto, off, and/or between sites
28 67 Unclear consensus 7–14 days Veterinarians onto, off, and/or between sites
29a 82 High 7–14 days Vaccination crews into, off, and/or between sites
30a 95 High 7–14 days Commercial crews onto, off, and/or between sites (e.g., 
manure haulers, feed trucks, and livestock haulers)
aIndicates a priority movement identified in this study.
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Time was expressed in a continuous scale using a slider with 
four labels from shortest (i.e., most critical, less than 48  h) to 
longest (i.e., least critical, more than 60  days). The slider was 
initially positioned at the longest time label. Respondents were 
instructed to assume all movements would take place according 
to their biosecurity protocols, if one existed, and to assume that 
movements were expected to occur the day after a restriction was 
implemented.
Data analysis
Perceptions of the risk of disease spread were assessed using an 
ordinal categorical scale (numeric values were never shown), 
so contiguous categories were not necessarily uniformly 
distanced from each other. Further, experts’ notion of the dif-
ference between any two contiguous choices could vary greatly. 
Therefore, it was not statistically appropriate to calculate means 
for this variable to assess overall perceptions of disease risk. 
Instead, these perceptions were analyzed by taking the upper two 
choices (“some risk” and “high risk”) as to indicate a substantial 
risk in the movement and the lower choices (“no or slight risk” 
or “low risk”) as to indicate no substantial risk. Therefore, scores 
were calculated based on the percent of experts who assigned 
a substantial risk for that movement (referred to as “high” for 
short from here on), with higher or lower percentages indicat-
ing a majority consensus. These “consensus” scores were used 
to identify the movements in which a substantial majority of 
experts (over 75%) agreed that the movement carries a high risk 
of disease spread. Conversely, a low percentage on these scores 
(below 25%) should be interpreted as a substantial consensus 
that a movement has low risk of disease spread, as it indicates 
the majority of experts determined the movement to have no or 
slight risk of disease spread.
FigUre 1 | risk of disease spread consensus scores and mean time until a negative business impact (bars represent seM) for each of the pork 
supply chain movements. A specific description of each movement ID number can be found in Table 1. Detailed analysis of each movement, along with the 
precise breakdown of expert responses for each movement, is best appreciated in the interactive web-based version of this publication (http://z.umn.edu/
pattersonfmd2016).
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The other per-movement measure, time until critical busi-
ness impact, was reported on a continuous slider scale, so the 
mean position of the sliders was calculated for each movement. 
However, because the labels placed on the scale were chosen to 
provide easily relatable time frames for respondents rather than 
to provide equidistant points on the timescale, absolute means of 
the positions were not a meaningful measure of time to critical 
business impact (e.g., a slider positioned two-thirds of the way 
between the labels >48 h and 7 days does not map onto an exact 
time value). For this reason, the mean times for each movement 
are reported as categories in Table  1, but are plotted based on 
their mean position in Figure  1 [for data and analysis scripts, 
see Ref. (6)].
Each movement was plotted based on the consensus scores of 
high risk of disease spread and the average time at which busi-
ness would be critically impacted if the movement were stopped 
(Figure  1). To determine which movements would be best 
candidates for proactive risk assessments, individual movements 
were identified in which there was at least a 75% consensus of 
a high risk of disease spread, and a critical (time-sensitive) 
importance to business continuity, defined as negative business 
impact within 7 days (appearing in the top-right quadrant of the 
plot). Conversely, movements that were deemed by experts to 
have a low or negligible risk of disease spread, combined with 
a minimal impact on business continuity (lower left quadrant) 
were also identified.
resUlTs anD DiscUssiOn
The recruited experts worked or owned facilities in many areas 
across the country. Of those who answered the demographic 
questions, 8 out of 10 producers and harvest industry respond-
ents reported to own or manage farms or production facilities 
in multiple states, and most respondents in allied industries 
(34 out of 41; 82%) reported involvement in multiple states. 
Respondents also reported to work in each of the seven regions of 
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the contiguous 48 United States. The vast majority of respondents 
reported having established biosecurity protocols for live animal 
sites or visits (42 out of 50; 84%).
When only considering the risk of disease spread, there were 
10 movements in which most of the experts (greater than 75%) 
indicated that the movement had some or high risk of disease 
spread. The movements with the highest consensus of high risk 
of disease spread, in order of agreement, are (1) commercial crews 
onto, off, and/or between sites (95%); (2) weaned pigs to off-site 
nursery, wean to finish, or finishing (multiple sources) (90%); (3) 
off size and cull pigs, sows, and boars to sale barn/buying station 
(84%); (4) feeder pigs from sale barn to production site (82%); 
and (5) vaccination crews into, off, and/or between sites (82%; 
see Table 1). These results are consistent with current Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) guidelines 
for animal disease risk management. According to FAO, animal 
diseases are spread most often by: the movements of live animals 
and animal products; by the transport of fomites, people, and 
equipment between farms; and animal comingling areas such as 
sale barns and slaughter plants (8).
When only considering impact on business, there were eight 
movements for which the mean of experts’ scores indicated 
business would be severely affected within 1 week of restriction. 
The movements with the shortest mean reported time to critical 
business impact were (1) employees onto, off, and/or between 
production site(s), (2) feed onto production sites, and (3) weaned 
pigs to an off-site nursery, wean to finish, or finishing (single 
source) (see Figure 1 and Table 1).
These results are consistent with the study conducted by Bargen 
and Whiting (5), which determined the time sensitivity of weaned 
pig movement off of sow farms. This was done by studying 15 sow 
farms in the Manitoba province of Canada and determined that 
if weaned pig movement off-site is restricted, the time to critical 
overcrowding was approximately 5  days (0.66 ±  0.88  weeks). 
Also, it makes logical sense that those movements pertaining 
to the basic husbandry of swine (feed availability, water, and 
environmental management), which are overseen by daily chore 
personnel, will have serious implications for animal health and 
welfare if disrupted (9).
Table  1 shows consensus scores for perceived risk of FMD 
disease spread, along with the mean time until a negative 
impact on business would occur across all 30 movement types. 
Movements with at least a 75% consensus of a high risk of disease 
spread, in combination with a time-sensitive window (less than 
14 days) were defined as priority movements, in which proactive 
risk assessments would be most advantageous. There were three 
movements that met the criteria with the shortest time-sensitive 
window of 2–7 days. They were, in order of the highest percentage 
consensus for risk of disease spread: (1) weaned pigs to off-site 
nursery, wean to finish, or finishing (multiple sources), (2) con-
tracted or shared livestock trucks onto, off, and/or between sites 
production sites, and (3) employees onto, off, and/or between 
sites. There were two additional priority movements that also had 
at least a 80% consensus for high risk of disease spread, however, 
had a longer time-sensitive window (7–14 days). These were, in 
order of the highest percentage consensus: (4) commercial crews 
onto, off, and/or between sites (e.g., manure haulers, feed trucks, 
and livestock haulers); (5) vaccination crews into, off, and/or 
between sites; and Off size and cull pigs, sows, and boars from 
sale barn/buying station to slaughter.
Returning to the movement of top priority, there are a number 
of features of moving weaned pigs to an off-site barn from mul-
tiple sources that may have prompted the experts to identify this 
particular movement as highest priority. There are a number of 
long-term health and logistical benefits that are captured when 
a barn is filled quickly with pigs of a similar age, which often 
requires inputs from multiple sow farm sources (9, 10). The nature 
of this movement, which may involve a trailer carrying weaned 
pigs to stop and pick additional pigs at multiple farms before 
arriving at its final destination, carries a risk of spreading disease 
to the farms visited. Additionally, when FMD virus naive pigs 
are presumably mixed with infected pigs at the destination site, 
virus spread is amplified in the new hosts, which will complicate 
further containment efforts (3).
Conversely, the movement of weaned pigs off a sow farm is a 
regular and essential function within the pork supply chain. In 
most cases, there is limited space available on sow farms to house 
weaned piglets for prolonged periods of time, and space must be 
made available frequently for the newest group of weaned pigs 
(5). For these reasons and according to the experts, this particular 
movement would have the strongest implications for the swine 
industry.
It is also noteworthy that movements related to the basic 
husbandry of swine, such as the movement of chore personnel 
and feed trucks, were widely considered to have a high risk for 
disease spread and of critical importance for business continu-
ity. Movement restrictions that limit some of the basic needs 
of domestic swine (such as food and water) will unsurprisingly 
cause serious negative consequences if not tended to. This reality 
must be considered despite the high risk of spreading disease 
further. Previous studies on this topic have not examined the 
importance of personnel movement to provide basic animal hus-
bandry, which highlights the need to consider these movements 
in national emergency preparedness plans.
Proactive risk assessments may also identify movements that 
should proceed in an FMD outbreak: those that that have a low risk 
of disease spread and would critically impact business in a short 
time if stopped. Two movements were perceived by experts to fall 
into this category. Less than 25% of experts identified “finished 
products to distributing” and “fresh products to point of service,” 
as having a high risk  of disease spread. More specifically, 19% and 
23% of experts, respectively, said the movements carried a high 
risk of disease spread, indicating the majority actually rated the 
disease spread as low. These movements were also perceived to 
critically impact business within 2–7 days, if stopped. This initial 
assessment would indicate that, in the event of an FMD outbreak, 
these two movements should be allowed to continue so as not 
to prevent finished products from reaching consumers and thus 
avoid interruption of the pork meat supply.
Conversely, there were no movements that were perceived by 
experts to have both a long time to critical business impact and 
a high risk of disease spread. However, two movements, which 
at least 75% of experts identified as having a high risk of disease 
spread, “off size and cull pigs, sows, and boars to sale barn/buying 
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station” (84%) and “feeder pigs from sale barn to production site” 
(82%), were reported as having a time to critical business impact 
between 14 and 21 days. As described by Taylor and Rushton (8), 
sites where animals are comingled from multiple sources and 
subsequently transported back to another farm have the potential 
to spread the disease further. This combination of high perceived 
risk of disease spread and low time criticality may indicate that 
these movements are logical candidates for immediate restriction 
in the event of an FMD outbreak.
While this study provides an initial assessment of movements 
that would benefit from proactive risk assessments, there are 
several limitations that future research should address. First, 
the study did not assess the specific expertise or experience of 
respondents, which could have been used to weigh responses for 
given movements based on the level of familiarity/expertise each 
respondent had in each movement. Second, the expertise sample 
was predominantly veterinarians and those in allied industry. 
Future work should specifically target more experts from the 
producer and harvest industries.
cOnclUsiOn
This work represents a preliminary descriptive analysis of the 
major pork supply chain movements, and the extent to which 
experts agree these movements may contribute to both FMD 
disease spread and how movement restrictions may critically 
impact business. While preemptive planning and risk assess-
ment is underway to prepare for a potential FMD outbreak 
in the United States, it is important to consider whether the 
benefits of restricting movement (thereby reducing the size or 
duration of the outbreak) actually outweigh the costs (interrupt-
ing business continuity or causing animal welfare concerns). 
This analysis helps to provide some context for the determina-
tion of managed movements within the swine industry, while 
considering potential consequences of disease spread paired 
with time sensitivity.
A recent analysis conducted by Paarlberg et al. (11), on the 
potential cost of an FMD outbreak in the United States, across 
all livestock sectors, estimated a decrease of $14 billion (9.5%) 
in United States farm income. Losses in gross revenue for live 
swine were estimated at a 34% reduction, and pork products at 
a 24% reduction (11). Given the severe economic losses, which 
would result in the event of an FMD outbreak in the United 
States, it is important to consider options, which may help to 
limit the size and scope of an outbreak, as well as support the 
continuity of low-risk business operations in order to safeguard 
industry vitality.
To ensure its economic viability, the pork industry must place 
a high priority on the development of criteria and the facilitation 
of agreements to allow specific movements of live swine, industry 
personnel, and pork products during all phases and types an FMD 
outbreak. This work provides an initial step to guide emergency 
planning, as it reveals movements that are critical to business 
vitality, and should thus be the primary focus of proactive risk 
assessments in order to minimize disruption of these movements.
As these results show movements pertaining to basic swine 
husbandry as well as the movement of weaned pigs off of sow 
farms, pose both a high risk of disease spread paired with a 
short window of time before severe economic or animal welfare 
concerns are realized. Effectively managing these movements 
will therefore require careful consideration of the cost to benefit 
ratio when issuing movement permits. The information of this 
study can also be used to help determine which movements 
are of little consequence if they are temporarily restricted in an 
effort to contain the outbreak (such as the movement of cull 
animals), as well as those that would have severe economic 
consequences without contributing much to the containment 
of disease spread were they to be restricted (movement of pork 
products to the consumers).
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